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Disagreement as Duty




This essay is an edited version of a paper presented at Université de Picardie Jules Verne
(Amiens, France) in June 2008 and at the NYU comparative Literature conference entitled
“Disagreement” in March 2010.
 
I. Introduction
1 This  essay  focuses  on  the  significance  of  disagreement  in  what  Cavell  has  coined
“Emersonian” perfectionism. This moral outlook holds that everyday moral duties and
choices,  unlike epistemological  cases,  ultimately rest on our personal assessment and
justification of an action. It is therefore possible (and likely) that disagreements point not
to moral incompetence, but to a conflict of desires – crucially including a conflict of ones
own desires. As a consequence, the demand of making oneself intelligible is a primary and
constant moral duty, without which we lose sight of the means of coming to an agreement.
Perfectionism further  assumes  that,  since  people  are  not  transparent  to  themselves,
conversations with friends form a decisive part of the moral life as well. Thus touching at
once  on  individual  needs  and  desires  as  well  as  on  the  foundations  and  limits  of
community,  these  assumptions  challenge  both  models  dominating  American  moral
thinking: (Mill’s) utilitarianism and (Kantian) deontology.1 I will primarily engage with a
critique of  the latter model,  according to which disagreement merely signifies moral
flaws. Moreover, to the extent that self can be distinguished on the basis of inclinations,
desires, opinions, and a voice of one’s own, Kant, in his demand for the moral realm to be
pure and for the voice to be universal, seeks to keep this self out of the moral realm
altogether,  thus founding what  a  perfectionist  would call  as  a  selfless  and friendless
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moral fantasy. To Cavell, the self and its desires and inclinations do not pose a serious
threat to moral reasoning – not per se at least. Instead, he aligns himself with a tendency
he sees  recurring throughout  the history of  philosophy (and literature,  film,  etc.);  a
tendency of thinkers who take conformity of the self to the community speaking for it to
be the most threatening attitude, especially in democratic societies. The importance of
friendship  becomes  yet  more  apparent  in  this  context,  as  I  shall  illustrate  through
Cavell’s  discussion  with  Saul  Kripke  on  the  moral  implication  of  Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical  Investigations  in  the  second  half  of  this  paper.  I  shall  first  outline  the
importance of  the self  for a perfectionist  moral  outlook by contrasting it  to Kantian
deontology.
 
II. Vices of Moral Reasoning: Kant and Perfectionism
2 According to Cavell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein, a philosophy that proceeds by means
of grammatical investigations neither aims at having us agree about certain statements
or judgments, nor at bringing an individual into communal agreement. The point lies
elsewhere, prior to the moment of such (dis)agreement. If we do not say, for example,
that we are of the opinion that the world exists, we do not do so because we believe the
contrary – that the world does not exist – but because the existence of the world is not a
matter that falls within the “grammatical” scope of what we call an opinion. It would
likewise be empty to say that we agree on the world’s existence – Cavell ironically adds
that we may just as well decide that it does. At stake here is an agreement in judgments,
without which we would never be able to (dis)agree about anything. That is to say: if our
disagreements about opinions are more than mere mutual misunderstandings, we agree
about the use of our words that express our opinions – which is far from saying that one
could not or should not doubt the existence of the world. The interest of an ordinary
language philosopher does not lie in the defense or preservation of ordinary beliefs or
common sense, but in learning the particular ground they occupy, whether we agree on
them or not. If this ground is to be found in language, this does not mean that one cannot
find such grounds to crack.
3 Disagreements  both  in  and  about  opinions  are  crucially  included  in  a  moral
perfectionist’s aspirations. This forms a stark contrast with a Kantian version of moral
reasoning,  which  crucially  relies on  agreement.  In  his  discussion  of  Kant’s  moral
philosophy, especially the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cavell highlights the
assumption of the existence of two worlds.2 In the moral realm, Kant distinguishes one
world in which man is determined by laws of causation from another one in which he is
free. The latter is the world of Reason – possessor and “bringer of law.” But Reason,
unlike the Understanding’s functioning in the field of sensation, does not impose its force
beyond our choice on the other world. Like the forms of the Understanding, the Law of
Reason is both universal and necessary, but it is not necessarily obeyed. This in fact forms
the cornerstone of Kantian morality: everyone endowed with Reason “ought to” have his
or her actions motivated in accordance to the Law of Reason. Kant insists that there is
only one Moral Law: the categorical imperative. This imperative – I will stick here to the
first of its well-known formulations – comes down to acting “only in accordance to that
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”
(Kant 1785: Ak. 420-1). The moral task is to realize the liberty characteristic of the realm
of Reason into the world otherwise governed by laws of causation.
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4 By positing the existence of two worlds, one of which remains – and always remains – to
be  realized  into  the  other,  Kant  inscribes  himself,  in  Cavell’s  view,  into  a  moral
perfectionist tradition that aims to further the self. Yet Cavell objects that we are not
always clear about the subjective principles of our actions. And even when we are, we are
not necessarily immoral if we do not want them to become universal laws. Yet there is a
more pressing point. Assuming that we know our maxim and desire its universalizability,
Kant demands that, for our action to be morally right, our obedience to the law must be
pure or unconditional. This is to say that actions should not be motivated by inclinations,
since inclinations are neither universalizable, nor do they mark our freedom. Cavell has it
that, for Kant, the reality of morality is discovered in the overcoming of inclination by
duty. Kant’s demand for purity further means that we should disregard any results from
our actions. So we are not supposed to expect a medal for helping someone in distress.
According to a Kantian morality, moral values are determined by intentions of actions
rather than by their effects. Regarding this essential Kantian point, Cavell remarks the
following:
Is it the case that fulfilling everyday duties (helping someone rather frail onto a
trolley, laying in groceries for a friend with the flu, not yielding to favoritism in
giving a grade or voting an award, hearing out a friend in grief, not cheating on
taxes) gives one a higher moral worth if  one fulfills  them grimly or affectlessly
rather  than  with  occasional  feelings  of  mild  satisfaction,  mild  exasperation,  or
relief, and with no thought in the world about whether anyone else does such a
thing or not? (Cavell 2004: 137)
5 Bluntly (if less eloquently) put: Cavell is asking, rhetorically, whether it seems fair to say
that my (expectation of) feeling good about having done something right devaluates, if
not disqualifies, the rightness of my action. With this objection, Cavell parenthetically
adds, he may be verging on “moral snobbery” – a characteristic vice, as he calls it, of
perfectionist aspirations. But perfectionism is not the only moral outlook with its own
inherent  vices:  from a  perfectionist  point  of  view,  “affectlessly”  performed everyday
duties may be called the characteristic vice of the Kantian version of moral reasoning.
6 This becomes clear in Cavell’s discussion of the first of Kant’s examples of the workings of
the categorical imperative (which is not, I hope, an example of an everyday duty): the
case of the man considering suicide. This is Kant’s version of the example, starting with
his description of the suicidal man’s maxim:
“From self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life when its longer duration
threatens more troubles than it promises agreeableness.” It is seen at once that
universalizing this maxim into a law of nature would contradict itself since it uses
self-love, which is to further life, to destroy life. Since it could not therefore, be a
law of nature, it opposes the supreme principle of all duty, namely the Categorical
Imperative. (Kant 1785: Ak. 422)
7 One may wonder whether a suicidal man actually thinks or should think of the action he
contemplates in terms of a moral duty at all, to say nothing of the tone in which Kant
imagines a suicidal man to express himself. Cavell really wonders, however, how many of
Kant’s admirers would actually be willing and able to defend the contradiction between
maxim and law, and whether they consider this to be a convincing argument in case the
suicidal man turns out to be a beloved one. The point being that an affectless conversation
of this kind may not be the morally right way to go.
8 Moreover,  Kant  claims  in  this  example  that  “it  can  be  seen  immediately”  that  the
universalized maxim is self-contradictory. This affirms his view that moral reasoning is
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an intuitive operation, to be exercised by anyone endowed with reason. There cannot – in
principle – be any dispute about its outcome. Any two people, in different words, will
agree whether a given maxim can or cannot be universally willed and therefore whether
an action is right. This is why Kant essentially relies on agreement as the foundation of
morality. For Cavell, however, Kant’s examples (including the suicidal man) strike him as
“fantasies of essentially isolated, friendless people” (Cavell 2004: 133) who do not stand in
need of any more company than that of their own reasoning faculty. This contradicts
Cavell’s observation that readers of Kant often run into trouble when asked to determine
“the” maxim of an action. So to be sure: Cavell credits Kant for the insight that actions
indeed have maxims. There are reasons for our actions, and to find the ground for these
reasons is itself a moral act. In Cavell’s phrase, this is to say that acting is a mode of speaking
. Yet he brings in against Kant that
[c]onversations  in  which  friends  explore  whether  an  act  is indeed  your  duty,
meaning any of your business, as well as meaning your inescapable business, and
whether if it is,  it is to be denied the name of doing your duty if you do it,  for
example, out of guilt, or remorse, or joy, seem to me to be of the essence of the
moral life and to leave open what makes duty real. (Cavell 2004: 133-4)
9 Far  from  denying  the  importance  of  real  duties,  then,  Cavell  aims  at  Kant’s  own
observation that we can never know absolutely whether or not we are acting, in Kant’s
words, “in conformity with duty but not from duty” [Ak. 398]. That is: the result of an
action may be good while the motivation of that action is not right. In yet other words,
while Kant makes it our duty to obey the moral law unconditionally, he affirms that we
can never exclude the possibility that some inclination contaminates the purity of our
obligation; that we are not, after all, secretly hoping to receive a medal for helping our
distressed fellows or that we are not in love with the suicidal man. I have argued above
that, for Cavell, such contaminations do not devaluate the moral status of our actions.
The  point  now is  this:  “That  our  purity  of  motivation  in  obeying  the  moral  law is
impenetrable to us is no more mysterious or revelatory about us than that our motives
and  desires  generally  are  not  transparent  to  us,  and  that  we  can,  in  caring  about
ourselves, make them less dark” (Cavell 2004: 143).
 
III. Moral Implications of Wittgenstein’s “Scene of
Instruction”
10 With this conclusion, let us return to Wittgenstein. Kant just called into question whether
we can know our conformity to the moral law to be pure. In what is known as the “scene
of instruction” in the Investigations,3 Wittgenstein asks how we can know, and justify, that
we are following a rule or law at all. To be sure, Wittgenstein is not specifically talking
about the moral laws or the categorical imperative, but Cavell, as we shall see, seeks to
extend his argument to include it. He does so specifically in response to Saul Kripke’s
interpretation of the same scene of Wittgenstein’s. Kripke’s interpretation is of interest to
Cavell  since Kripke,  like  Cavell,  does  not  interpret  the Investigations  as  attempting to
refute skepticism, as so many others have done. Unlike Cavell, however, Kripke takes rules
to be fundamental  to Wittgenstein’s response to the threat of  skepticism. He further
assumes that Wittgenstein’s response has, in Cavell’s words, “to do with a particular way
of bringing the individual into communal agreement” (Cavell 1990: 66).4
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11 According to the opening paragraph of the Investigations, explanations – and Wittgenstein
means all explanations – “come to an end somewhere.” In the scene of instruction this
translates  into  the  following:  “If  I  have  exhausted the  justifications  I  have  reached
bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do’”
(Wittgenstein  1953:  § 217).  Wittgenstein’s  remark  specifically  answers  a  question
concerning the ability to follow rules. The answer applies, for example, to the question
how a pupil should know that he or she is indeed making a mathematical addition when
s/he is asked to do so. Yet Cavell’s quarrel with Kripke ultimately centers on question of
authority  in  the moral  life,  and for  that  reason I  want  to  take a  brief  look at  their
respective  interpretations,  beginning  with  Kripke’s  comment  on  Wittgenstein’s
exhaustion of justifications. “The entire point of the skeptical argument,” Kripke writes,
“is ultimately that we reach a level where we act without any reason in terms of which we
can justify our action. We act unhesitatingly but blindly” (Kripke 1982: 87). In Kripke’s
account, our inclination to simply do what we do in the absence of justifying reasons can
either be accepted or rejected by someone else, particularly by some representative of the
community  (say  a  teacher  who  judges  whether  a  pupil  is,  indeed,  adding  and  not
multiplying). So my action will be acceptable when my inclination matches with that of
someone else.
12 According to Cavell, this interpretation of Wittgenstein is based on a misreading of the
phrase “Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’” He takes Kripke to read this
sentence as: “Then I am licensed to say: “This is simply what I am inclined to do.” The
second of these two sentences, Cavell argues, obscures the fact that when we are inclined 
to say anything, we do not necessarily go on to actually saying it, meaning that there are
considerations against saying that “this is simply what I do.” When there are, for all my
inclinations,  still  hesitations,  I  am exactly not  acting “unhesitatingly but  blindly,”  as
Kripke had it  – especially not in cases in which the justifications for our actions are
exhausted.
13 Kripke’s idea, in short, comes down to a public licensing through matching inclinations.
According to Cavell, this means that my inclination is but a conformation, which is to say
that I do not have an inclination I could properly call my own – something John Stuart
Mill, among many others, was warning against. Over and against Kant’s idea of morality
as the overcoming of inclination by duty, Mill holds (in Cavell’s phrase) that “morality is
discovered in the overcoming of conformity by inclination or desire.” Mill further claims
(in  a  phrase  that  resonates  remarkably  well,  say,  with  Heidegger’s  analysis  of  “das
Mann”) that it no longer occurs to anyone “to have any inclination except for what is
customary.”5 From this vantage point, Kripke’s claim that we act “unhesitatingly” points
to a certain self-confidence, but the blindness that goes with it now implies, in Cavell’s
reading,  that  we may,  for  all  our  confidence,  regard ourselves  absolved from taking
responsibility for our actions and inclinations alike. This becomes all the more pressing
when our inclinations do not happen to match, in which case we run the risk of being
separated out,  of  being treated as  a  morally  incompetent  person,  if  not  as  a  lunatic
standing in need of being excluded from society. In this light, Kripke’s argument now
sounds as if he seeks to place those with matching inclinations above reproach.
14 Reproaching Kripke for this view (and for attributing it to Wittgenstein), Cavell is far
from denying that justifications for our actions can and in fact often do come to an end.
What he denies, rather, is that all that Wittgenstein’s response to skepticism comes down
to is to be able to say: “I agree with you, this is my inclination too.” “Suppose,” Cavell
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rhetorically asks, “that driving you to work I say: ‘I’m inclined to run this red light’; if you
reply: ‘My inclination agrees with yours,’ have you licensed me to run the light?” Cavell
not only denies this to be the case, he also doubts, as argued above, that a mismatch of
inclinations should be indicative of moral incompetence. He rather claims that the moral
life exactly starts at the moment of what he calls “intellectual exhaustion” (Cavell 1990:
81), at the point of reasons “coming to an end,” or the point at which “there is something,
but inevitably so little to say in explanation or justification of my ground” (Cavell 1990:
97). Cavell writes: “If I take your actions as slight or as treachery and refuse to endure
them any longer, this judgment is itself my response and my responsibility” (Cavell 1990:
113-4). And for all Kripke’s emphasis on the importance of rules in Wittgenstein, Cavell
further argues that there is no rule which “tells me when I may end the conversation
unilaterally; it is my judgment, not a rule, that lets me conclude that I did what I could”
(Cavell 2004: 179). In a word: Judgments, not rules, form the “bedrock” or “finality” or
“ground” of morality.
15 This in fact characterizes moral cases and distinguishes them from epistemological ones.
This is first of all the case because the assessment of a moral case, including the description 
of an action – including its justification and intention – is itself already a moral act. But
also, more crucially perhaps, Cavell argues in The Claim of Reason that in moral cases it is
ultimately up to me to determine the grounds for doubt. This is not so in epistemological
cases, for example the one of the bird with a red head I claim to have seen in the garden
and in which I tell you I saw a goldfinch. If you object that there are other birds with red
heads (and you name a few), I will either have to specify further why I think this specific
kind of bird, was indeed a goldfinch or I must start doubting my claim. A sentence like “I
don’t care that goldcrests (say) also have red heads,” would, on the contrary, provide
evidence of my incompetence, not so much in the realm of ornithology as in the realm of
language – that is: in the realm of the human.
16 Contrast this epistemological case with the moral case of a friend challenging my support
for a prisoner by claiming that he is an enemy of the state. In this case I may very well
counter your objection along the lines of: “I don’t care that he is an enemy of the state.”
This  is  not  to  say  that  there  is  no  limit  to  moral  competence.  It  would  be  morally
incompetent, for example, to deny the relevance of your doubts or objections. When I say
that I do not care that he – say, my brother – is an enemy of the state, I do not deny that it
matters at all whether he is such an enemy or not; I am saying, rather, that my brother’s
being an enemy of the state does not count as a reason for me to doubt my loyalty to him
(though it might be for someone else). This can be a perfectly sound moral judgment,
whereas I cannot competently say that it does not count as a reason for me that gold crests
also have red heads.6
17 As Cavell notes, however, the ground for my moral judgment remains open to revision
and opposition. No representative of society can license me to say what I say and do what
I do, any more than any moral law or rule can justify me beyond reproach. This is not to
say that Cavell is licensing me to turn my back on society or to disregard my everyday
duties. It is to say that the only one who can justify me is me – the self. But I crucially
cannot justify myself by myself:
What justifies what I do and say is, I feel like saying, me – the fact that I can respond
to an indefinite range of responses of the other, and that the other, for my spade
not  to  be  stopped,  must  respond to  me,  in  which case  my justification may be
furthered by keeping still. The requirement of purity imposed by philosophy now
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looks like a wish to leave me out, I mean each of us, the self, with its arbitrary needs
and unruly desires. (Cavell 1990: 77)
18 Moral justification relies on the self, indeed, but not, as in the Kantian fantasy, on the self
in isolation, nor, as in Kripke’s case, by having my own inclinations conform with those of
the community (or its representatives). For Cavell, I justify myself in my responsiveness
to the other – in conversation with a friend especially. Cavell argues that it may always be
the case that our inclinations do not match; that we shall not arrive at an agreement; that
consequently I decide to end our conversation. Yet agreement is not the primary aim of
conversations on moral issues. The question is rather: when, at what point, do I end the
conversation? Did I do everything I could to prevent it? Can I (sometimes indeed) feel
satisfied by pointing out a contradiction in your reply and leave it at that? How do my
reasons enter the conversation, in what tone do I express them, with what degree of
authority or of accusation?
19 Such conversations, then, do not take the form of philosophical argumentation. Of course
any conversation would be futile unless agreement is to be hoped for.  Yet it is more
important in moral reasoning that a judgment is mine than that it is sound.  And it is
perhaps yet more crucial that my friend, far from aiming to win an argument, offers
alternatives to my view. A friend, for Cavell, is an Aristotelian, a Nietzschean, and an
Emersonian:  it  is  my most worthy enemy – confrontational  and challenging – whose
standard I am constrained to accept. Yet unlike Kant’s constraint of duty, the friend’s
significance lies in his constraint through attraction. “Moral reasoning,” Cavell writes in
that regard, “is not to take me from irrational to rational choice […] nor from a will
corrupted by sensuous concerns to one measured and chastened by the demands of the
moral law […] but to take me from confusion to (relative) clarity in seeking a world I can
want” (Cavell 2004: 32, emphasis added). Far from opposing them to enemies or from
distinguishing  them from family  members  (why?  even texts  can  be  friends),  friends
represent the unattained yet attainable self. Moreover, and finally, there is a political
dimension tying friendship (and thus the self) to the issue of democracy.
20 Although agreement or consent is not,  from a perfectionist point of view, the aim of
moral or political reasoning, it is not the case either that, for that reason, I do not or
ought not to give my consent to my community or society. Yet in doing so, Cavell writes,
“I recognize the society and its government, so constituted, as mine; which means that I
am answerable not merely to it, but for it” (Cavell 1982: 23).7 Rather, the political is one
among many areas that offers as many possibilities as constraints for finding one’s own
voice, as well as for exploring what that voice represents. Conformity marks the failure of
such attempts, but also manages to keep this failure from view; remember Mill saying not
only that we no longer have any inclination except for what is customary, but also that
this does not occur to anyone. So the challenge of making oneself less dark is a matter of
political responsibility. This is to say that, in a democracy at least, it is not enough to
cooperate – cooperation being the cornerstone of Rawls’ Theory of Justice.8 Unlike Rawls,
Cavell does not attempt to provide criteria for a society that could pass as being good
enough. And while he agrees with Rawls that our consent is asked for, he does not agree
that we should provide it on a conditional basis (as Rawls does), but on a provisional one:
he  asks  us  to  give  our  consent  from above.  In  other  words:  unlike  a  Rawlsian,  the
perfectionist does not consent to an ideal society. He or she rather takes the present
society to heart, only to demand its change as a whole: by attaining to a further self, a
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perfectionist takes on responsibility for the relative proximity or distance, not from a
principle, but from a less unacceptable world.
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NOTES
1. Cavell  is  careful  not  to  conceive  of  moral  perfectionism  as  an  alternative  to  either
utilitarianism  or  deontology.  Instead  of  speaking  of  a  theory,  he  consistently  refers  to
perfectionism as an “outlook,” which, rather than setting limits to morally sound judgments,
seeks to explore new venues and perspectives for an attainable future self. Both Kant and Mill
have important “contributions” to make to such an outlook, while perfectionism offers valuable
critiques in return.
2. Cavell 2004. In this paper, all citations of Kant’s work are from the Groundwork as quoted by
Cavell.
3. Wittgenstein (1953: § 217).
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4. For Kripke’s interpretation of the scene of instruction, see especially Kripke (1982: 79-89).
5. See Mill (2009: 74); quoted in Cavell (2004: 96-7).
6. On this point, see also Gerrits 2010.
7. On the importance of Cavell’s view that I am not constituted outside of the political or social
realm (as many liberalists hold), see Hammer 2002, esp. 128-37.
8. On this final point, see Gerrits 2010.
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